IKEA’s Global Sourcing Challenge Essay Example for Free

IKEAs world-wide Sourcing Challenge EssayIndian Rugs and youngster Labor (A)In May 1995, Marianne Barner faced a tough-minded decision. After just now two years with IKEA, the worlds largest furniture retailer, and less than a year into her job as parentage area manager for carpets, she was faced with the decision of cutting off cardinal of the comp any(prenominal)s major suppliers of Indian rugs. While much(prenominal) a impress would disrupt run and affect sales, she chuck together the reasons to do so quite compelling. A German TV station had just broadcast an investigative report naming the supplier as one that used infant hollow in the wareion of rugs made for IKEA. What frustrated Barner was that, like all other IKEA suppliers, this large, well-regarded order had recently spell out an addendum to its supply contract explicitly forbidding the use of kidskin labor on painfulness of termination. Even more difficult than this short-term decision was the la nguish-term action Barner k freshly IKEA must take on this exit.On one hand, she was being urged to sign up to an industry-wide response to growing concerns about the use of kidskin labor in the Indian carpet industry. A recently formed partnership of manufacturers, importers, retailers, and Indian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) was proposing to cater and monitor the use of Rugmark, a label to be pose on carpets certifying that they were made without child labor. Simultaneously, Barner had been conversing with volume at the Swedish Save the Children organization who were urging IKEA to ensure that its response to the situation was in the ruff interest of the childwhatever that might imply. Finally, there were some who wondered if IKEA should not just leave this hor give the axes nest. Indian rugs accounted for a tiny part of IKEAs turnover, and to these observers, the time, cost, and reputation risk posed by continuing this harvest-time line seemed not worth the profit potential.The Birth and Maturing of a Global Company1Certain enlarge drive been disguised. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective wariness. Copyright 2006 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http//www.hbsp.harvard.edu. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any meanselectronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwisewithout the permission of Harvard Business School. operative out of the family kitchen, he sold straightforwards such as fountain pens, cigarette lighters, and binders he purchased from low- outlayd sources and therefore advertised in a newsletter to local shopkeepers. When Kamprad matched his competitors by adding furniture to his newsletter in 1948, the quick success of the new line conduct him to give up the wee items. In 1951, to clip product returns, he opened a display store innearby lmhult village to allow customers to glance products before stealing. It was an immediate success, with customers traveling s hitherto hours from the capital Stockholm by train to visit. Based on the stores success, IKEA displaceped accepting mail orders.Later Kamprad reflected, The basis of the modern IKEA concept was created at this time and in principle it still applies. First and foremost, we use a catalog to tempt people to visit an exhibition, which at presend is our store. . . . Then, catalog in hand, customers can see simple interiors for themselves, touch the furniture they want to buy and and then write out an order.2 As Kamprad developed and refined his furniture retailing job work he became increasingly frustrated with the way a tightly knit cartel of furniture manufacturers controllight-emitting d iode the Swedish industry to keep prices high.He began to view the situation not just as a business opportunity just excessively as an unacceptable social conundrum that he wanted to correct. portend a vision for IKEA that would later be articulated as creating a better life for the numerous people, he wrote A disproportionately large part of all resources is used to satisfy a small part of the population. . . . IKEAs aim is to change this situation. We shall offer a wide range of home furnishing items of good design and function at prices so low that the majority of people can afford to buy them. . . . We have great ambitions.3The small newsletter brie fly sheet expanded into a full catalog. The 1953 issue introduced what would become another key IKEA feature self-assembled furniture. Instead of buying complete pieces of furniture, customers bought them in like a shot packages and put them together themselves at home. Soon, the knockdown concept was fully systemized, saving transport and storage costs. In classifiable fashion, Kamprad turned the savings into still dispirit prices for his customers, gaining an even larger make outing among young postwar householders looking for well-designed but inexpensive furniture. Between 1953 and 1955, the familiaritys sales doubled from SEK 3 million to SEK 6 million.4Managing Suppliers Developing Sourcing PrinciplesAs its sales took off in the late 1950s, IKEAs radically new concepts began to go on stiff opposition from Swedens large furniture retailers. Sothreatened were they that when IKEA began exhibiting at trade fairs, they colluded to stop the company from taking orders at the fairs and eventually even from showing its prices. The cartel also pressured manufacturers not to bewray to IKEA, and the few that continued to do so oftentimestimes made their deliveries at night in unmarked vans. Unable to meet demand with such constrained local supply, Kamprad was forced to look abroad for new sources.In 1961, he contracted with several furniture factories in Poland, a country still in the Communist eastern bloc. To assure quality output and reliable delivery, IKEA brought its knowhow, taught its processes, and even provided machinery to the new suppliers, revitalizing Polands furniture industry as it did so. Poland soon became IKEAs largest source and, to Kamprads delight, at much lower costsonce again allowing him to reduce his prices. quest its success in Poland, IKEA adopted a oecumenic procurement principle that it should not own its means of production but should seek to develop fill up ties by supporting its suppliers in a long-term relationship.a Beyond supply contracts and technology transfer, the relationship led IKEA to make loans to its suppliers at reasonable rates, repayable through future shipments. Our objective is to develop long-term business partners, explained a senior purchasing manager. We commit to doing all we can to keep them competitiveas long as they re main equally commit to us. We are in this for the long run.Although the relationship between IKEA and its suppliers was often described as one of mutual dependency, suppliers also knew that they had to remain competitive to keep their contract. From the outset they silent that if a more cost-effective alternative appeared, IKEA would try to help them respond, but if they could not do so, it would move production. In its continuous quest to lower prices, the company developed an unusual way ofidentifying new sources. As a veteran IKEA manager explained We do not buy products from our suppliers. We buy unused production capa urban center. It was a philosophy that often led its purchasing managers to seek out seasonal manufacturers with spare off-season capacity. There were galore(postnominal) classic examples of how IKEA matched products to supplier capabilities they had sail makers make seat cushions, window factories produce table frames, and ski manufacturers bring in chairs i n their off-season. The manager added, Weve always worried more about finding the right management at our suppliers than finding high-tech facilities. We will always help good management to develop their capacity.Growing sell Expanding AbroadBuilding on the success of his first store, Kamprad self-financed a store in Stockholm in 1965. Recognizing a growing use of automobiles in Sweden, he bucked the practice of having a downtown showway and opted for a suburban location with ample parking space. When customers drove home with their furniture in flat jam-packed boxes, they assumed two of the costliest parts of traditional furniture retailinghome delivery and assembly.In 1963, even before the Stockholm store had opened, IKEA had expanded into Oslo, Norway. A decade later, Switzerland became its first non-Scandinavian market, and in 1974 IKEA entered Germany, which soon became its largest market. (See exhibit 1 for IKEAs worldwide expansion.) At each new store the same simple Scandi navian-design products were endorse up with a catalog and offbeat advertising, presenting the company as those impossible Swedes with strange ideas. And reflecting the companys conservative values, each new entry was financed by previous successes.b During this expansion, the IKEA concept evolved and became increasingly adjudge.(Exhibit 2 summarizes grand events in IKEAs corporate history.) It still built large, suburban stores with knockdown furniture in flat packages the customers brought home to assemble themselves. But as the concept was refined, the company required that each store follow a predetermined design, set up to maximize customers exposure to the product range. The concept mandated, for instance, that the living room interiors should follow immediately after the entrance. IKEA also operated customers with featuressuch as a playroom for children, a low-priced restaurant, and a Sweden Shop for groceries that had made IKEA Swedens leading food exporter. At the same t ime, the range little by littleaThis policy was modified after a number of East European suppliers broke their contracts with IKEA after the reach of the Berlin Wall opened new markets for them. IKEAs subsequent supply chain problems and loss of substantial investments led management to develop an internal production company, Swed woods, to ensure delivery stability. However, it was decided that only a restrain amount of IKEAs purchases (perhaps 10%) should be sourced from Swedwood. b By 2005, company lore had it that IKEA had only taken one bank loan in its corporate historywhich it had paid back as soon as the cash flow allowed.The Emerging Culture and Values5As Kamprads evolving business philosophy was formalized into the IKEA vision statement, To create a better everyday life for the many people, it became the foundation of the companys strategy of selling affordable, good-quality furniture to mass-market consumers around the world. The cultural norms and values that develop ed to support the strategys implementation were also, in many ways, an extension of Kamprads personal beliefs and style. The true IKEA spirit, he remarked, is founded on our enthusiasm, our constant will to renew, on our cost-consciousness, on our willingness to assume responsibility and to help, on our humbleness before the trade union movement, and on the simple mindedness of our behavior. As well as a summary of his aspiration for thecompanys behavioral norms, it was also a good statement of Kamprads own personal management style.Over the years a very distinct organizational culture and management style emerged in IKEA reflecting these values. For example, the company operated very informally as evidenced by the open-plan office landscape, where even the CEO did not have a separate office, and the familiar and personal way all employees addressed one another. But that informality often masked an intensity that derived from the organizations high self-imposed standards. As one s enior decision maker explained, Because there is no security available behind status or closed doors, this environment really puts pressure on people to perform.The IKEA management process also stressed simplicity and attention to detail. compound rules paralyze state Kamprad. The company organized anti-bureaucrat week every year, requiring all managers to spend time works in a store to reestablish contact with the front line and the consumer. The workpace was such that executives joked that IKEA believed in management by running around.Cost consciousness was another strong part of the management culture. Waste of resources, said Kamprad, is a mortal sin at IKEA. Expensive solutions are often signs of mediocrity, and an idea without a price tag is never acceptable. Although cost consciousness extended into all aspects of the operation, travel and entertainment expenses were particularly sensitive. We do not set any price on time, remarked an executive, recalling that he had once phoned Kamprad to get approval to fly first class. He explained that economy class was full and that he had an urgent appointment to keep. There is no first class in IKEA, Kamprad had replied. Perhaps you should go by car. The executive completed the 350-mile trip by taxi.The search for creative solutions was also highly prized with IKEA. Kamprad had written, Only while sleeping one makes no mistakes. The vexation of making mistakes is the root of bureaucracy and the enemy of all evolution. Though readying for the future was encouraged, overanalysis was not. Exaggerated planning can be fatal, Kamprad advised his executives. Let simplicity and common sense characterize your planning.In 1976, Kamprad mat the need to commit to melodic theme the values that had developed in IKEA during the previous decades. His thesis, Testament of a article of furniture Dealer, became an important means for spreading the IKEA philosophy, particularly during its period of rapid international expansi on. (Extracts of the Testament are given(p) in Exhibit 3.) Specially trained IKEA ambassadors were assigned to key positions in all units to spread the companys philosophy and values by educating their subordinates and by acting as enjoyment models.In 1986, when Kamprad stepped down, Anders Moberg, a company veteran who had once been Kamprads personal assistant, took over as president and CEO. But Kamprad remained almost involved as chairman, and his influence extended well beyond the ongoing daily operations he was the self- positive guardian of IKEAs deeply embedded culture and values.Waking up to Environmental and tender IssuesBy the mid-1990s, IKEA was the worlds largest specialized furniture retailer. Sales for the IKEA Group for the financial year ending August 1994 amount SEK 35 billion (about $4.5 billion). In the previous year, more than 116 million people had visited one of the 98 IKEA stores in 17 countries, most of them drawn there by the companys product catalog, w hich was printed yearly in 72 million copies in 34 languages. The privately held company did not report profit levels, but one estimate put its net margin at 8.4% in 1994, yielding a net profit of SEK 2.9 billion (about $375 million).6 After decades of seeking new sources, in the mid-1990s IKEA worked with almost 2,300 suppliers in 70 countries, sourcing a range of around 11,200 products. Its relationship with its suppliers was dominated by commercial issues, and its 24 trading service offices in 19 countries primarily monitoredproduction, tested new product ideas, negotiated prices, and checked quality. (See Exhibit 4 for selected IKEA figures in 1994.) That relationship began to change during the 1980s, however, when environmental problems emerged with some of its products. And it was even more severely challenged in the mid-1990s when accusations of IKEA suppliers victimization child labor surfaced.The Environmental Wake-Up FormaldehydeIn the early 1980s, Danish authorities passe d regulations to define limits for formaldehyde emissions tolerable in building products. The chemical compound was used as binding glue in materials such as plywood and particleboard and often seeped out as gas. At concentrations above 0.1 mg/kg in air, it could cause watery eyes, headaches, a burning sensation in the throat, and difficulty breathing. With IKEAs profile as a leading local furniture retailer using particleboard in many of its products, it became a undercoat target for regulators wanting to publicize the new standards. So when tests showed that some IKEA products emitted more formaldehyde than was allowed by legislation, the case was widely publicized and the company was fined.More significantlyand the real lesson for IKEAwas that due to the publicity, its sales dropped 20% in Denmark. In response to this situation, the company quickly established stringent requirements regarding formaldehyde emissions but soon found that suppliers were failing to meet its standa rds. The problem was that most of its suppliers bought from subsuppliers, who in turn bought the binding materials from glue manufacturers. Eventually, IKEA decided it would have to work directly with the glue-producing chemical companies and, with the collaboration of companies such as ICI and BASF, soon found ways to reduce the formaldehyde off-gassing in its products.7 A decade later, however, the formaldehyde problem returned.In 1992, an investigative team from a large German newspaper and TV company found that IKEAs best-selling bookcase series, billy goat, had emissions higher than German legislation allowed. This time, however, the source of the problem was not the glue but the lacquer on the bookshelves. In the shake up of headlines describing deadly poisoned bookshelves, IKEA immediately stopped both the production and sales of Billy bookcases worldwide and corrected the problem before resumingdistribution. Not counting the cost of lost sales and production or the damage to goodwill, the Billy incident was estimated to have cost IKEA $6 million to $7 million.8These events prompted IKEA to address broader environmental concerns more directly. Since wood was the principal material in about half of all IKEA products, forestry became a natural starting point. Following discussions with both Greenpeace and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF, formerly World Wildlife Fund) and using standards set by the Forest Stewardship Council, IKEA established a forestry policy stating that IKEA would not accept any timber, veneer, plywood, or layer-glued wood from full natural forests or from forests with a high conservation value. This meant that IKEA had to be willing to take on the task of tracing all wood used in IKEA products back to its source.9 To monitor compliance, the company appointed forest managers to carry out random checks of wood suppliers and run projects on responsible forestry around the world. In addition to forestry, IKEA identified four other area s where environmental criteria were to be applied to its business operations adapting the product range working with suppliers transport and distribution and ensuring environmentally conscious stores. For instance, in 1992, the company began using chlorine-free recycled paper in its catalogs it redesigned the best-selling OGLA chair originally manufactured from beechso it could be made using waste material from yogurt cup production and it redefined its packaging principles to eliminate any use of PVC. The company also maintained its partnership with WWF, resulting in numerous projects on global conservation, and funded a global forest watch program to map intact natural forests worldwide. In addition, it engaged in an ongoing discourse with Greenpeace on forestry.10The Social Wake-Up Child LaborIn 1994, as IKEA was still working to resolve the formaldehyde problems, a Swedish television documentary showed children in Pakistan working at weaving looms. Among the several Swedish com panies mentioned in the film as importers of carpets from Pakistan, IKEA was the only highprofile name on the list. Just two months into her job as business area manager for carpets, Marianne Barner recalled the shockwaves that the TV program sent through the company The use of child labor was not a high-profile public issue at the time. In fact, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child had only been published in December 1989. So, media attention like this TV program had an important role to play in raising awareness on a topic not well know and understoodincluding at IKEA. . . . We were caught completely unaware. It was not something we had been paying attention to.For example, I had spent a duet of months in India learning about trading but got no exposure to child labor. Our buyers met suppliers in their city offices and rarely got out to where production took place. . . . Our immediate response to the program was to apologize for our ignorance and acknowledge that we wer e not in full control of this problem. But we also committed to do something about it. As part of its response, IKEA sent a legal team to Geneva to seek input and advice from the International Labor Organization (ILO) on how to deal with the problem.They learned that Convention 138, adopted by the ILO in 1973 and ratified by 120 countries, committed ratifying countries to working for the abolition of labor by children under 15 or the age of compulsory information in that country. India, Pakistan, and Nepal were not signatories to the convention.11 Following these discussions with the ILO, IKEA added a clause to all supply contractsa black-andwhite clause, as Barner put itstating simply that if the supplier employed children under legal working age, the contract would be cancelled.